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In the Suprellle Court 
of the State of Utah 
\\'11'\SLO\\' C. COLE. 
Plaintiff and Responclcnt, 
Vs. 
0TARGUERITE D. COLE. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7717 
\Vinslow C. Cole, the respondent in the above-entitled 
matter, secured a decree of divorce from his wife. the appel-
lant, in the District Court for Millard County, State of Utah, 
on the 19th day of May, 1936. In that action the defend-
ant's counterclaim for divorce was denied and the divorce 
granted to the plaintiff on the ground of desertion. 
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With respect to the property of the parties, the court, in 
paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of its Findings of Fact, found that 
each of the parties was entitled to one-half of the value of 
the community property and that one-half of said amount 
would be due the defendant. In addition to this specific find-
ing with respect to community property, paragraph 10 of the 
Findings provided: 
"1 0. That the defendant is entitled to alimony 
or support money in the sum of $60.00 per month 
for a period of one year from date, and $30.00 per 
month thereafter for one year, or until the further order 
of this court." (See page 4 of the T r.) 
The Conclusions of Law which the court reached pro-
vided that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant the sum 
of $1,037.50 as her share of the community property, plus 
the further sum of $1.323.00 which represented the amount 
the plaintiff had borrowed from the defendant. In addition 
to the specific provisions with respect to the division of the 
property of the parties, the Conclusions of Law provided as 
follows: 
"That the plaintiff should pay to the deFendant 
as alimony for her support and maintenance, the sum 
of $60.00 per month for a period of one year. com-
mencing on June 1. 1936; and after the expiration of' 
one year, that is after June 1, 1937, the further sum 
of $30.00 per month for one year, or until June 1, 
1938, or until the further order of this court." (See 
page 5 of the transcript.) 
The Decree of divorce based upon the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law made the following provisions with rr-
spect to the division of the property of the parties and the ob- ,j 
ligation for payment of alimony and support money: ·j 
"It is further ordered. adjudged. and df'cr<:>ed thnt 
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the plaintiff pay to the defendant the sum of 
S 1037.50, being one-half of the value of the com-
munity property, and the further sum of $ 1323.00, the 
unpaid amount of the principal and the accrued interest 
on the same owing by the plaintiff to the defendant, 
and that upon pa~ment by the plaintiff to the defend~ 
ant of the aggregate amount of said sums, to-wit: a 
total of $2360.50, the title to all of the community 
property shall ipso facto vest in the plaintiff, and it' 
the record title to the same or any part thereof is not 
in the plaintiff. this court will enter a decree vesting 
in the plaintiff the record title, as well as the equitable 
title, to all community property. 
"It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
the plaintiff pay to the clerk of this court for the use 
and benefit of the defendant as alimony and for her 
support and maintenance the sum of $60.00 per month 
for a period of one year commencing on June 1, 1936; 
or a total of $720.00; and after the expiration of one 
year, that is, commencing June 1, 1937; the sum of 
$30.00 per month for one year, or until June 1, 1938; 
or a total of $360.00; unless the court otherwise order 
and direct; and aU sums so naid to the clerk by the 
plaintiff for the use of the defendant shall be by sairl 
clerk transmitted and forwarded to her without delay." 
(See page 2 of the Tr.) 
The above provisions are cited for the court's convenience, 
and to point out that specific provision was made with respect 
to the property of the parties that in no way was related to 
the provision for alimony. 
At the time of the divorce the defendant was qualified 
as a publ;c school teacher and was able to earn $150.00 per 
month. This fact was found to be true by the Findings of 
Fact of the court, as shown in paragraph VI on page 22 of 
the transcript. On the 23rd day of February, 1951, the said 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defendant filed a Petition for Modification of Divorce Decree 
with the District Court for Millard County alleging that con-
ditions had substantially changed since the entry of the di-
vorce decree in that she had lost her ability to support her-
self and had become dependent upon the charity of others. 
She further claimed that the financial condition of the plain-
tiff respondent had substantially improved since the entry 
of the decree, and prayed, based on these facts, that the 
court enter a further order for alimony for her support. 
The plaintiff denied the alleged substantial change of 
conditions and the matter came to trial. As a result of the 
triaL the court denied the petition of the defendant appellant. 
As reflected by the Memorandum of Decision and the 
Findings of Fact, the trial court found that there h~d been 
a substantial change in the condition of the defendant ap-
pellant's health and in the financial circumstances of the plain-
tiff respondent. In the case of the appellant, at the time of 
her petition for modification she was partially deaf. suf-
fering from high blood pressure and a heart ailment. all of 
which prevented her from obtaining gainful employment. For 
several years she had been depending upon her family and 
others for her maintenance. (See paragraph VI of the Find-
ings of Fact, at page 22 of the Tr.) The financial condition 
of the plaintiff respondent. on the other hand, had improved 
from the sum of $1.037.50, which, at the time of the divorce 
renresented one-half of the property of the parties, to the sum 
of $37,857 in home, farm lands, and water stock. with an 
apartment building having an additional value of $6,000.00, 
and his yearly income had increased from $2,250.00 per 
year to $5,250.00 per year, not including rentals receivert 
from the apartment building. 
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Although the trial court found a substantial change in the 
condition of the parties as described above. the requested 
award was denied. 
The foregoing constitutes a brief statement of the facts 
of this case. 
ST/\TE1'1E~T OF POINTS RELIED ON IN 
THIS APPEAL 
The defendant appellant represents to the court and 
urges a reversal of the decision of the lower court upon the 
following grounds: 
POINT NO. I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT THE ORIGINAL DECREE FINALLY ADJUDI-
CATED THE RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT TO ALJ-
MONY. THE EXPREJSS LANGUAGE OF THE DECREE 
RESERVED JURISDICTION FOR A SUBSE,QUENT DE-
TERMINATION ,OF ALIMONY. 
POI:\TT NO. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT WHETHER AN AWARD OF ALIMONY WOULD 
SEEM JUST AND EQUITABLE TO THE· PRESENT DE-
PENDENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WAS A. LffiGAL 
GROUND TO BE CONSIDERED IN MAKING AN 
AvVARD. 
POINT NO. III. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT 
SHOW THAT A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE MA-
TERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PLAINTIFF AND 
THE DEFENDANT HAD TAKEN PLACE JUSTIFYING 
AN AWARD OF ALIMONY AS PRAYED, AND THE 
DECISION OF THE COURT THAT THE EVIDENCE 
DID NOT JUSTIFY AN ORDER FOR ALIMONY WAS 
CONTRARY TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND TO 
THE COURT'S OWN FINDINGS. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1. T:HE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT THE ORIGINAL DECREE FINALLY ADJUDI-
CATED THE RIGHT Of THE DEFENDANT TO ALI-
MONY. THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE DECREE 
RESERVED JURISDICTION FOR A SUBSEQUENT DE-
TERMINATION OF ALIMONY. 
The plaintiff respondent in this case has not raised any 
question with respect to the right of the defendant to receive 
an award of alimony as granted under the original decree. In 
view of this fact, pursuant to the law wb· h obtains in this 
jurisdiction as set down by Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 P. 
781, and Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 53 P. 2d 
428. the award of alimony made in the original decree in 
this case must be presumed as having been granted upon 
such evidence as justified the award. The right to alimony 
of the defendant appellant was not forfeited by such conduct 
as may have entitled her husband to a divorce. 
Inasmuch as the original award of alimoqy, therefore, 
must be presumed to have been based upon conditions merit-
ing the same, notwithstanding any misconduct on her part. 
the award of alimony would be subject to the same rules with 
respect to a modification of the divorce decree in that regard 
as if she were the prevailing party. This represents a modifi-
cation of the old rule that permanent alimony would not be 
awarded a wife where the husband obtains a divorce based 
upon her dereliction. But this general rule was productive of so 
much hardship, and in so many instances left the wife a prey 
to shame, that i~ circumstances which justified it an award of 
alimony was granted. Undoutedly the wisdom of this public 
policy was given great weight vvhen the problem of awarding 
the wife alimony under such circumstances first arose in Utah 
8 
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in the Doe v. Doe, supra. case. Further affirmation of this 
policy is found in the recent case of Alldridge v. Alldrige, 
:229 P. 2 681, __________ Utah __________ , Supreme Court of Utah, 
No. 7525. April 10, 1951. wh~re the husband was granted 
a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty resulting in great 
mental distress. It was shown that the parties had lived to-
gether quite some time, that both parties had contributed sub-
santially to the marriage, and that there was evidence of her 
poor health. Con~equently, an award of permanent alimony 
was directed by the Supreme Court, though refused by the 
trial court. :)i• 
In the instan· ;ase the trial court, by its Memorandum of 
Decision and its finding in paragraph VII of the Findings of 
Fact at page :23 of the transcript. ruled that the original award 
of alimony was a final adjudication of the plaintiff's right to 
alimony, a{ ,d that it therefore did not have power to make 
a subsequ~ht award of alimony. In this respect the court'~ 
attention is directed to the Findings of Fact. Conclusions of 
Law and Det:ree made at the time of the granting of the In-
terlocutory Decree of Divorce. (See pages 2, 4, and 5 of the 
Tr.) The Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Decree 
all deal separately with the problem of a division of the com-
munity property which should be made between the parties. 
The order awarding to each of the parties a one-half interest in 
their community property and ordering the plaintiff respond-
ent to pay to the defendant appeilant one-half of the value of 
said community property in accordance with said order are 
dearly separate and apart from the subsequent finding, con-
rlusion of law and order of the court with respect· to the pay-
ment of alimony. 
In the face of the clarity of the findings, conclusions of 
lmv and decree it could not reasonably be argued that the 
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court intended the award of alimony to be part and parcel of 
the division of property. It is evident that two things were 
accomplished with respect to the property problems of the 
parties: ( 1 ) The property of the parties was given a total . 
value and divided equally between them. Included was a 
further order requiring the plaintiff respondent to repay the 
defendant appellant for money loaned to hrm, and ( 2) the 
plaintiff respondent was ordered to pay defendant alimony, 
payable in monthly installments. In this connection no words 
of finality were used whatsoever. The award was not made 
"in lieu of all alimony" nor was language in any way synony-
mous with such phraseology used. Rather, in paragraph 10 
of the Findings of Fact, as recited above in the Stat~ment of 
Facts, the court found that the defendant appellant was 
entitled to alimony in certain monthly installments covering a 
certain period of time "until the further order of this court." 
In the Conclusions of Law, in this connection, the court 
used the same phraseology. In the Decree the court, in a 
separate paragraph dealing solely with alimony, ordered that 
the monthly installments of alimony be paid for the period 
specified ''unless the court otherwise order and direct.'' The 
language so employed does not partake in any way of the 
terminology of finality which would have to be found in order 
to substantiate the trial court's holding that the award of ali-
mony was a final adjudication of the plaintiff's right to ali-
mony. To hold that the award was a final adjudication in the 
face of the language employed would do obvious violence to 
the ordinarily accepted meaning of the words. Rather than 
being synonymous with finality the language employed would 
seem to indicate the intention of the court to reserve jurisdic-
tion to make such further order as the circumstances might 
justify. The interpretation for which the appellant ·herein 
contends has been confirmed in the case of Swallow v. Swal-
10 
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low, 92 Atl. 872, 84 N. /. Equity 109, where the phrase 
"further order of the court" was interpreted to mean that the 
order of the court made at that time should obtain until a 
superceding order in connection with the same subject matter 
should be made. Further support for such an interpretation 
may be found in the following cases where, though the ques-
tion of alimony was not involved, the phrases "until the fur-
ther order of the court," "until ortherwise ordered by the 
court," "unless otherwise directed by the court," etc. were 
the subject of interpretation: Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 52 
N.E. 2nd 27, 315 fvlass. 176; Ex Parte Glines, 94 P. 
668. 20 Okla. 446; Curtis v. Bachman, 110 Calif. 433, 
42 P. 91 0; Hokum v. Chic. R. 1. & P. Railway Co., 112 P. 
1023, 27 Okla. 667; People v. Priest, 73 N.E. 1100, 
181 N.Y. 300; Federal Signs System v. Amavet, 7 La. App. 
680. 
Further light on the question of whether or not the lan-
guage used by the court in granting alimony in the present in-
stance may be interpreted as a final adjudication of the rigltt 
of alimony or as an award of alimony subject to modification 
according to changed conditions, circumstances, habits, and 
conduct of the parties may be obtained from the well-known 
Cody v. Cody case, 47 Utah 456, 154 P. 952. Under head-
notes 4 and 5 of said case, the court discusses the problem of 
a Hnal or full discharge· of the obligation of alimony, and said 
with respect to the same: 
''Thus I think the order awarding $20 a month 
for the support of the child was, on such averments 
and proof, subject to modiHcation. Such an order by 
its very nature is continuing. So also was the order 
awarding the custody of the child continuing and sub-
ject to modification according to changed conditions, 
circumstances, hab'its, and conduct of the parties. So 
11 
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also would be an order allowing alimony for a desig-
nated amount per month or other stated period, or until 
the happening of a contingency or contingencies; but 
where, upon issues in evidence, the question of ali-
mony is set at rest, either by awarding a gross sum in 
lieu of all rights in and to the husband's property, or 
where, in lieu of all such rights specific property is in 
fee awarded to the wife, or \vhere, upon issues and 
evidence adduced no alimony whatever is awarded, 
then I think such an order is final and constitutes a 
full discharge, unless the order awarding no alimony is 
based upon the grounds that the husband then had no 
property and no means with ,.vhich to support the wife, 
and physically was unable to earn support for her, and 
that he thereafter acquired property or otherwise be-
came able to support her." 
Reading the above excerpt from the opinion in the Cody 
v. Cody case, and applying the same to the present fact sit-
uation, it would seem evident that the award of alimony made 
in the present instance was an avyard which by its very nature 
is continuing. This is further borne out by the holding of the 
court in Barraclough u. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196, 
111 P. 2d 792. In that case the trial court found that hy 
stipulation the plaintiff had "consented to accept $450 as ali-
mony herein, payable in monthly installments of $75," and 
based upon this finding. decreed that: 
"Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded and the 
defendant is hereby required to pay to her. the sum 
of $450, as alimony herein, as follows: $75 on or be-
fore the 1st day of June, 1939, and $75 on or before 
the 1st day of each and every month thereafter until 
the said sum of $450 shall have been paid in full: 
provided that a II amounts paict on said awnrd during 
the pendency of this action shall be credited thereon." 
r\ftcr the entry of the interlocutory decree the plaintiff pe-
12 
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titioned the trial court to modify the decree as to. alimony. 
This was denied by the court on the ground that the stipula-
tion between the parties constituted a lump sum complete 
and final settlement of all alimony between the parties and 
that such settlement had become a final judgment as to ali-
mony in so far as a petition to modify was concerned. The 
plaintiff cited this holding as error and on appeal the Su-
preme Court held, under headnotes 2 and 3, 
'·Therefore, the trial court erred in determining 
the agreement here constituted a 'complete and final 
settlement of all alimony between the parties and 
that such settlement has become a final judgment as 
to alimony* * *insofar as a petition to modify is con-
cerned.' In a divorce action the trial court should make 
such pro~sion for alimony as the present circumstances 
of the parties warrant, and any stipulation of th~ 
parties in respect thereto serves only as a recommenda-
tion to the court. If the court adopts the .suggestion of 
the parties it does not thereby lose the right to make 
such modification or change thereafter as may be re-
quested by either party based on some change in cir-
cumstances warranting such modification.'' 
Except for the fact that the provision for alimony in the 
Barraclough case was based on a stipulation, the legal aspects 
)f the award of alimony in the Barraclough case and in the 
instant case are identical. In both instances a specified amount 
of alimony was ordered paid by way of monthly installments, 
extending over a specified period of time. The factual situation 
in the instant case is even stronger than that in the Barraclough 
case by reason of the addition of the words "unlessthecourtoth-
erwise order and direct,'' reserving power to make a further or-
der in the matter. In view of this decision, it seems evident that 
in the -instant case the court in the original decree did not 
Rnally adjudicate the right of the defendant appellant to ali-
13 
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mony and that the language of the decree was, therefore, 
not such as would prevent the court from exercising the power 
granted by 40-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, to make a modi-
fication thereof. if circumstances justified the same. 
POINT NO. II. TSE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT WHETHER AN AWARD OF ALIMONY WOULD 
SEEM JUST AND EQUITABLE TO THE PRESENT DE-
PENDENTS OF ·THE PLAINTIFF WAS A LEGAL 
GROUND TO BE CONSIDERED IN MAKING AN 
AWARD. 
The trial court in finding number VIII at page 23 of the 
transcript found that it would be ''unjust and unequitable to 
the present dependents of the plaintitf" to make an order 
requiring him to pay further alimony to the defendant 
appellant. 
Based upon the finding, the trial court. in the Conclu-
sions of Law, concluded that it would be unjust and unfair 
to the present dependents of the defendant to make such an 
order. Based upon this Finding of Fact and Conclusion of 
Lmv, and the others included therein, the court denied the 
defendant appellant's prayer for a further ilWard of alimony. 
It seems evident that whether or not an avvard of alimony 
would be fair and just to the present dependents of the plain-
btl' respondent is not a material issue in this case for the reason 
that they are not parties to the suit. and that his obligation to 
the . defendant appellant with respect to alimony arises out 
of a prior obligation which he owed to her by reason of their 
marriage and the provisions of their subsequent divorce decree. 
Assuming that the appellant is correct in her position that 
the provision of alimony in the original divorce decree was a 
continuing award which was subject to modi!ication, as more 
fully explained above, then respondent's obligation pursuant 
14 
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to said decree would precede any subsequent obligation which 
he might undertake or contract. Numerous annotations at 30 
A.L.R. 79, 64 A.L.R. 1269, and 112 A.L.R. 246 all bear 
out the fact that remarriage and contraction of new obligations 
and responsibilities thereby. subsequent to the time when a 
decree of the court was entered requiring the payment of 
alimony. does not constitute a fact to be considered in de-
termining whether or not a change of circumstances has taken 
place sufficient to justify a modification of the decree of 
divorce. 
Furthermore. the finding of the court concerning plain-
tiff's rather substantial financial picture. cannot justify the 
court's conclusion that his financial condition and earning 
ability are insufficient to make an award. 
POINT NO. III. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT 
SHOW THAT A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE MA-
TERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PLAINTIFF AND 
THE DEFENDANT HAD TAKEN PLACE JUSTIFYING 
AN AWARD OF ALIMONY AS PRAYED, AND THE 
DECISION OF THE COURT THAT THE EVIDENCE 
DID NOT JUSTIFY AN ORDER FOR AI.JIMONY WAS 
CONTRARY TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND TO 
THE COURT''S OWN FINDINGS. 
The old rule which obtained independent of statute. that. 
permanent alimony will not be awarded a wife where the 
husband obtains a divorce on grounds of her fault or marital 
misconduct. was modified because it was productive of so 
much hardship and so frequently left the wife a "prey to 
starvation and shame." (Am. /uris., Vol. 17, page 478.) In 
the present case the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
show ample justification for the application of the modified 
rule. 
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In paragraph VI of the Findings of Fact, at page 22 of 
the T r.. the court finds as follows: 
"That the defendant, at the time of' the divorce. 
was qualified as a public schoolteacher, and was able 
to earn $150.00 per month. That she is now partially 
deaf and has high blood pressure and a heart ailment, 
· all of which prevent her from obtaining gainful em-
ployment, and that for several years she has been 
dependent upon brothers and sisters and other rela-
tives for her maintenance. That the defendant has 
no property, except. an interest as an heir of her 
father in a home, which interest is of a value not ex-
ceeding $500.00." 
Most certainly the above finding must be acknowledged as 
meaning that a very substantial change in her material cir-
cumstances has taken place, thnt she is suffering a great deal 
of hardship and that she has well-nigh been left "a prey to 
starvation and shame." 
On the other hand. the financial circumstances of the 
plaintiff respondent have materially improved. His present 
holding of property totals approximately $40,000, exclusive 
of the interest of his present wife in the apartment house. 
This represents an increase of more than fifteen times in the 
value of his holdings from the time of the original divorce. His 
salary per year, not including apartment rentals. has more than 
doubled. increasing from $2,250 per year to $5.250 per year. 
In view of the apparent material change in the circum-
stances of the appellant and the respondent, as reflected in 
the findings of the trial court, it is evident that there is not 
only a need for assistance in her behalf but that there is more 
than sufficient legal justification for the court to exercise the 
power \tvhich it has under 40-3-5, Utah Code Annotated. 
1943, and grant to th~ defendant appellant an award of 
alimony. 
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CONCLUSION 
The defendant submits that the court committed error in 
refusing her petition for modification of the decree of divorce 
upon the grounds that the original Decree was a final adjudi-
cation of the defendant appellant's right to alimony and that 
a further award of alimony would not only be unjust and in-
equitable but was not justified under the circumstances. It is, 
therefore, submitted that the case should be reversed with 
directions to the trial court to grant the petition of the defend-
ant for further award of alimony. 
Respectfully submitted,, 
KING & ANDERSON. 
Attorneys /or Defendant and Appellant. 
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